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The effects of sanctions will call for great sacrifices among our 
peoples. We cannot stand against the sanctions campaign; thus we 
call upon the rest of the world that as it exercises what it feels 
to be a moral duty it should... increase support to SADCC states so 
as to cushion the indirect effects of sanctions to us.
- King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho (1985), 
SADCC Summit
The systematic destruction of the infrastructure indispensable to 
the functioning of our economies by South Africa's racist army [and 
its proxies] is in the context of the survival of the racist regime 
which at all costs seeks to maintain the economic links of 
dependence created during colonialism... It is not difficult to 
conclude that it is natural for our countries', which have suffered 
losses at the hands of apartheid which surpass tens of billions [of 
USA dollars], continuously strive for the speedy end of that regime 
since its existence is translated into grief, suffering, 
destruction and great economic backwardness.
- President Eduardo dos Santos of Angola (1986), 
SADCC Summit
We must look for our reward in the faces of our children, the 
flowers that do not wither.
- President Samora Moise Machel of Mozambique (1985)
Their struggle is our struggle,
Their fall will assuredly be our fall.
- Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (1986) 
Tribute to the late President Machel
The War, Unseen, Unheard
That the Republic of South Africa is a state based on apartheid 
institutionalised, legally required and forcefully imposed racial inequality 
and oppression - and that it faces an escalating struggle to maintain itself 
against the black majority of the people under its rule is well known. That
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the RSA is a regional power much stronger than its neighbours - the 
independent states of Southern Africa - and that, in defence of apartheid, it 
sometimes mounts attacks and invasions againnt them is fairly well known as is 
its use of proxy forces (variously termed rebels, armed bandits, MNR, UNITA, 
LLA, Super-Zapu, Mshala Gang, etc) to destabilise and disrupt the economies, 
polities and societies of those neighbours. In that sense it is true that 
there is - well beyond the region - an awareness that the Republic of South 
Africa is waging war against Southern Africa as well as against its own 
people.
But the scale, depth and parameters of RSA's regional war of aggression do 
remain largely unseen, unheard. A few events are heard and noted: an
assassination raid against South African refugees asserted to be ANC cadres 
here; an attempted or successful sabotage of a port or a rail-line or an oil 
field there; a terrorist kidnapping or massacre somewhere else and a clash 
between the Republic of South Africa’s armed forces and those of a national 
government seeking to restore sovereignty and civil rule in yet another place. 
These are real events, they do add up for their readers to a vague impression 
that a war is in progress. But what they do not show is that the war is a 
full scale economic war with crippling macroeconomic costs for Angola and 
Mozambique today and all too probably for Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana 
and Lesotho tomorrow. Nor do they show that this is a war that kills people 
on a massive scale, that every four minutes an infant or small child who in 
the absence of RSA’s war of aggression against Southern Africa would have 
lived, dies in Angola or Mozambique. The economic and human fronts of this 
holocaust do remain the war unseen, unheard - even it must be admitted in much 
of the Southern African region.
A Total Strategy
The leaders of the Republic of South Africa believe they face a "total 
onslaught" against their state and, therefore, have devised a ’total strategy’ 
to counter that threat. Devised and acted upon for this is not merely war 
gaming. It is war perceived as war a l’outrance (to total victory or total 
destruction). The nature and practice of that total strategy within RSA are 
beyond the scope of this paper and - at least in broad outline - are becoming 
moderately widely and well known. What is less understood is the scope and
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scale of its regional component.
The Republic of South Africa seeks nothing less than to make Southern Africa 
safe for apartheid and profitable to the apartheid economy. In one sense that 
is arguably only a more extreme variant of the security and economic goals of 
any dominant regional power with aspirations to hegemony. However, even at 
that level it needs noting that historically precisely such goals and the 
attempt to act on them against regional opposition have given rise to a high 
proportion of regional conflicts and wars down the centuries.
But the Republic of South Africa and its regional strategy are also specific 
to itself and its region. The RSA is both a strong, independent regional 
power less subject to international influence than most and a "special kind of 
colonialism" (to borrow the ANC's formulation). Therefore, it sees its very 
existence as at stake in its war for regional military and economic hegemony.
Further, it wrongly perceives the basic threat to apartheid as external
(whether in terms of exiles and border raids or of hostile independent
neighbours and economic delinking) not as internal (the struggle of the black 
majority in the Republic of South Africa) and so displays what is - given the 
misformulation of the basic threat - a paranoid perception of the region.
Paranoid (and totally inadequate to meet the basic internal challenges to
apartheid) it may be and is, but none the less destructive for that.
Regionally the strategy has two broad fronts: that of providing mutual - if
grossly uneven - benefits plus bribes and that of waging economic and military 
war. The former - which is of late rather falling into disuse - can be 
treated briefly.
RSA builds economic units in neighbouring states which bind them to it when 
its sees doing so as economically useful in a context it can control. The 
Cahora Basa dam scheme (with Portugal - then the most dependable and amenable 
of the states on the Republic of South Africa’s periphery) is an example. RSA 
was to get cheap power, an expanding market in the Mozambique province of
Portugal, a strengthened Portuguese line of defence against the schwaartgevaar 
(the 'black peril'). Portugal was to get some power, irrigation water for a 
500,000 settler agricultural barrier to the advance of the liberation war, a 
chance of more secondary industry and foreign investment. The repeated - and 
ongoing proposals - to buy Lesotho's (and as it is the headwater state of the
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Orange River, Namibia's) water for the Transvaal is in its broad parameters 
another such project. So are the two railway lines linking Swaziland to the 
South African rail and port system (and by-passing Maputo-Matola in 
Mozambique). So has been finance for monumental projects in Malawi's new 
capital at Lilongwe.
On a lesser scale the Republic of South Africa does provide export credit to 
not very creditworthy buyers - e.g. Zambia in recent years. This creates
dependence, a sense of mutual interest, a growing market for the hard pressed 
manufacturing sector. The South African Transport Services (SATS) provides - 
at a price in hard currency as well as influence while 'cooperating' and the 
clear potential for creating a void by departing - technical assistance, 
specialised services and both several dozen locomotives and several thousand 
rail wagons to neighbouring independent Southern African rail systems.
This front has three basic aims:
1. to provide room for the expansion of and the earning of hard currency by 
key sectors (manufacturing, transport) of the Republic of South Africa' 
economy;
2. to create and to reinforce patterns of dependence causing a looking 
toward and disinclination to alienate RSA; plus
3. a capacity for RSA to destabilise by suspending links in the event of 
conflict.
The War Front
The war front of the total strategy has four main strategic instruments which 
are tactically combined in its individual campaigns. These are: (1) economic
sanctions (destabilisation); (2) targetted assassination or kidnapping raids 
to remove (or seize) specific persons or groups of persons; (3) targetted 
sabotage against key economic and infrastructural targets; (4) mass terrorism 
(in the technical sense - violence against persons and targets which are not 
in themselves of crucial importnce designed to crete fear and terror, loss of 
confidence and apathy, dislocation and the collapse both of production and of
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civil society) against people, trained personnel and the infrastructure of 
household economic activity and civil society. These are carried out by the 
civilian agencies of the South African state and - subject to some reluctance 
and footdragging in some cases - by South African enterprises (private in 
addition to public) as well as by the armed forces of the Republic of South 
Africa (including mercenary units) and its armed proxy forces operating in the 
independent states.
The main concerns of this paper are with the economic and human costs of this 
war of aggression, not with its military parameters. These will, necessarily, 
be alluded to when discussing instruments, results and increasing the capacity 
to resist but their analysis in any depth or detail lie outside the focus and 
possible scope of the presentation as well as the competence of the author.
Economic sanctions by RSA (whose opposition to sanctions against apartheid is 
correlated to its commitment to, and perception of the crucial impact of, its 
own economic sanctions to defend and stabilise apartheid) take several forms. 
The most dramatic was the 1985-86 partial blockade of Lesotho cutting off 
food, fuel, normal external trade and most international movement. The most 
threatened has been the expulsion of the 350,000 odd Southern African 
"contract workers" working in the Republic of South Africa (largely in the 
mining sector) and the up to 1,200,000 seasonal, semi-official and illegal 
Southern African workers also working there. The effect would be totally 
destructive of the Basotho economy (Lesotho has virtually no domestic economy 
in the normal sense; it is a long distance bed-sitting room of the South 
African Free State and Rand areas) and of the rural household economies of 
Southern Mozambique; plus to a slightly lesser extent of Southern Malawi and 
of areas in Botswana and Swaziland. In the case of Mozambicans total phased 
repatriation was announced in September and begun in October 19 8 6.
A less known sanction has been deliberate (and often uneconomic in the narrow 
user sense) diversion of South African cargo away from Mozambique's southern 
rail and harbour net (built up over eighty odd years primarily to service such 
cargo, the revenue from which was vital to the territorial economy's external 
economic balance). Traffic has been reduced from over 6 million tonnes a year 
before independence to under 1 million in 1985 while the average revenue per 
tonne has also been cut by switches from high or middle to low tariff cargo.
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Spot destabilisation has also been achieved by on and off interruption or 
delay (usually purportedly for •'technical" reasons) of key Southern African 
imports and exports. These have included imports of petroleum products and 
fertiliser and the supply of leased locomotives as well as chilled beef 
exports. In 1986 following the Commonwealth Mini Summit on sanctions against 
apartheid, the Republic of South Africa imposed deposit and control schemes on 
Zambian imports via, and licensing regulations on Zimbabwean exports to, RSA 
nominally for statistical and anti smuggling reasons but fairly nakedly to 
warn what its powers to impose both transit traffic and market sanctions were.
Targetted raids have been aimed at African National Congress (ANC) personnel 
and refugees. There have been over a score counting less publicised 
assassinations, kidnappings and border raids. In the past year Maseru, 
Gaborone, Harare, Lusaka and Mbabane and other points in Swaziland have been 
raided. In the strict sense of killing key ANC personnel these raids have 
been literally rather hit or miss. In that of killing both South African 
refugees and Southern African bystanders or of kidnapping actual 'priority’ 
wanted persons they have been deadly albeit the total deaths are probably of 
the order of 500 - a very small proportion of the total war related deaths. 
They have probably disrupted the civil and the information structures of the 
ANC to some degree, but their main impact has been to force both the ANC and 
its Southern African hosts to adopt precautionary measures limiting ANC 
presence and in several cases removing South African refugees to less exposed 
locations.
Targetted aggression on key economic and infrastructure units has been a 
central strategic element in full scale RSA armed forces invasions (to date 
limited to Angola among independent Southern African states although also 
including the permanent illegal occupation of Namibia); border and long 
distance sabotage raids by RSA units (sometimes disguised as "proxy" force 
units as in the attacks on the Pungwe road-rail-pipeline bridges in Mozambique 
in 1981 and on the Cabinda oil installations in Angola in 1985) and proxy 
force activities (with or without direct RSA technical and expert personnel 
'assistance'). Captured documents from the earlier through the mid-1980s 
underline this focus.
Targets have included vital productive units, e.g. the Luanda oil refinery and 
Cabinda oil installations in Angola, the Zambesia province tea estates and
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mines and the Sofala and Maputo province limestone quarries feeding cement 
plants in Mozambique and major infrastructural units, e.g. hydroelectric dams 
in Angola and the Maputo thermal plant as well as the central power grid in 
Mozambique. However, their most massive thrust has been against the Southern 
African regional transport lines which would - if rehabilitated and running 
normally - end the transport dependence vice the Republic of South Africa has 
constructed since 1965 (UDI in Southern Rhodesia as it then was).
UNITA has blocked the Lobito Bay line from Zambia to the Atlantic virtually 
continuously for over a decade. The MNR (and South African units) have closed 
the Maputo-Zimbabwe, Beira-Malawi and Nacala-Malawi rail lines and kept them 
closed since 1983/84. The Maputo-Swaziland line is subject to increasingly 
frequent "unscheduled activity" (i.e. sabotage). The Beira-Zimbabwe rail, 
pipeline and road corridor as well as the Malawi-Zirababwe road corridor 
through Mozambique's Tete province are kept open and running with minor 
disruptions only by the use of up to 10,000 Zimbabwean and several thousand 
Mozambican troops along their entire lengths. The key - and unattained - 
objective of South Africa's launching a full scale UNITA onslaught in central 
Mozambique has been to break the Beira corridor and thus render Zimbabwe and 
Botswana totally dependent on transport routes transitting RSA.
The fourth component of the strategy is the use of mass terrorism by proxy 
organisations - MNR, UNITA, LLA, Super-Zapu, Mshala Gang. They are supplied, 
equipped, trained, armed, paid, transported, directed and on occasion led by 
RSA. These are not normal opposition or rebel groups - they are agents of 
their paymasters and backers with very little (decreasing in the case of 
UNITA which once was a provincial or regional party) independent existence 
except as bands of brigands analogous to medieval outlawed rubber barons and 
broken men (very much so for the remnants of various Portuguese and Rhodesian 
units). They do not seek to provide a substitute civil society support system 
(health, education, relief food) or - except in showpiece redoubts as at Jamba 
in Angola and Milanje in Mozambique - a governmental/administrative apparatus 
at all. Their raison d'etre is destruction either - as sketched above - in 
targetted sabotage or by mass terrorism and their overriding instrument vis a 
vis the civilian population is creating fear overriding hate not building or 
even seeking loyalty. Certainly they are rendered more effective by despair 
at governmental non-success (a non-success their actions aggravate) and by 
over-reaction by security forces, but their roles are virtually wholly
military, negative and totally force based not civil, alternative programme 
and loyalty grounded.
Mass terrorism has been applied most generally and destructively to Mozambique 
and Angola. It has been used in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and - marginally - Zambia, 
but on a much lower level (and one hard to assess quantitatively in Zimbabwe 
because of the three stream - Super ZAPU, ZAPU politico - military dissidents, 
apolitical bandits - nature of the "dissidents" there).
Mass terrorism has been used in the majority of the provinces of Angola and in 
all Mozambican provinces at various times since 1975 with a major heightening 
in Angola from 1980 and in Mozambique from 1981. It is largely rural attacks 
on defended cities have been relatively rare except as part of much more 
overtly RSA forces led joint campaigns, although the late 1986 MNR campaign in 
Mozambique may reflect a change in tactics in this respect. The targets have 
been the physical infrastructure of civil society (schools, clinics, water 
points), of food supply (homesteads, storage transport) and equally the human 
(kidnapping, maiming, killing of technical assistance personnel, priests, 
agricultural technicians, drivers, health workers, teachers). No single 
target is of itself of particular significance and the total damage is caused 
more by - very real and reasonable - fear leading to abandonment of rural 
civil society, production and transport - than by the cumulative loss of 
assets or even of human life.
The results in terms of destroyed or abandoned health posts and schools, burnt 
out or abandoned and looted homesteads and small villages, looted and wrecked 
warehouses and shops, killed or lost ("not under control" in Mozambican 
terminology) livestock and abandoned or burnt fields, in broken (by loss of 
vehicles and bridges and of capacity to protect those that remain) transport 
links are ubiquitous and massive. About 3 million Angolans and 5.5 million 
Mozambicans (half the rural population) have been driven (by force and/or 
fear) from their homes with severe to total losses of assets, food supplies 
and ability to produce. Of these about 1 million are so recent or have so 
little ability to rehabilitate themselves as to be in imminent danger of 
starvation (repeating 1982-84 war and terrorism linked famine deaths in 
Mozambique and Angola).
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Economic Damage - Eclectic Estimates
The economic costs of war are hard to estimate. Two general approaches are 
possible. The first seeks to compile a relatively complete list of damage 
done; output lost by direct war destruction and indirect prevention of
investment; other revenue losses (e.g. transit traffic diversion in the case 
of Mozambique; being forced to use more costly routes in the cases of the 
landlocked states); resources diverted to security above normal levels.
There are problems with any such calculation. If all capital stock losses and 
output losses (including indirect ones) are counted a certain confusion among 
stocks and flows - and a consequential double counting - arises. In 
practice, lists tend to be incomplete and estimates problematic (e.g. valuing 
assets destroyed at a melange of historic, present replacement or subsequent 
replacement cost) with a bias toward underestimation.
The most systematic estimates based on totalling particular costs and the
economic growth losses resulting from reduced investment are those of the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (Overview, SADCC Harare, 
SADCC Gaborone, 1985 Annex B) and a revised estimate by R. H. Green and C. B. 
Thompson "Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South Africa and Sanctions" 
in D. Martin and P. Johnson, Destructive Engagement, Zimbabwe Publishing
House, Harare, 1986, pp.271-273).
Head SADCC Estimate
Direct war damage 1,610,000,000 1,610,000,000
Extra defence spending 3,060,000,000 3,310,000,000
Higher transport, energy costs 970,000,000 970,000,000
Smuggling (looting) 190,000,000 190,000,000
Refugees (including internal
displaced persons) 660,000,000 660,000,000
Loss of existing production 800,000,000 800,000,000
Lost economic growth 2,000,000,000 4,000,000,000
Trading arrangements 340,000,000 590,000,000
TOTAL 1980-1984 10,120,000,000 12,940,000,000
The detailed definition of the categories and a review of the methodology are 
presented in the sources cited.
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Ad justing through 1986 - on a basis consistent with the original estimates:
The sharp increase in 1985 over the 1980-1984 average relates to escalation of 
aggression, the rising defence bill, cumulative output losses and inflation.
The Angolan 1980-85 estimate (in Security Council, S/17648, 22-xi-85, United 
Nations, New York) of $10.5 billion would, on the assumption that Angolan 
losses are 55$ to 60$ of the regional total which seems to apply to the other 
estimates cited, implies a regional 1980-85 total of $17.5 billion to $19*1 
billion dollars which is consistent with the $17.12 billion and $19.94 billion 
estimate set out above. However, the Angolan estimate specifically states 
that certain indirect costs have not been included.
These estimates are clearly order of magnitude only. They do not include loss 
of income from remittances - a major item in the case of Mozambique since RSA 
had deliberately reduced the number of contract workers recruited from 
110-120,000 before independence to about 65,000 in 1986 when they announced 
total termination of recruitment and repatriation on completion of contract. 
The 1981-86 loss to Mozambique measured in terms of official remittances is of 
the order of $600 million over 1980-86 (depending on treatment of exchange 
rates). However, it is arguable that in part this loss was offset regionally 
by higher recruitment in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland than would otherwise 
have been the case. A1 the estimates are nominally at least in current prices 
except those for asset destruction which are in general historic cost and thus 
are biased downward in terms of present nominal values by the rapid inflation 
of the past half decade.
The basic point is not the question of margins of error - plus or minus 25$ on 
the SADCC-Thompson/Green estimates may well be a reasonable guess. It is that 
$25-28 billion is of the same order of magnitude as SADCCfs 1984 regional GDP 
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billion would leave a massive burden.
Loss of Gross Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product loss estimates can be approached in another way. This 
involves estimating the counterfactual (estimated) growth in the absence of 
war and comparing it with the actual outturn. Using rough direct impact 
estimates and using a multiplier, or other indirect effect estimation method, 
to get total macro economic costs is a less elegant variant of this approach. 
The former method is suitable for Angola and Mozambique subject to the caveat 
that the counterfactuals are very problematic while the second may be more 
appropriate to the other seven for whom losses are much smaller and - at least 
at the first round - less generalised.
Arguably an optimal approach would be to convert all losses into terminal year 
prices but, given the dubious nature (or absence) of GDP deflators, a sum of 
current price losses may in practice be preferable.
The GDP loss calculations represent flows over a stated period including 
output loss during that period from capital stock destroyed or not built 
because of war induced diversion of resources. However, by definition they do 
not include the future loss of GDP stream resulting from these asset gaps or 
from the time lag and resource diversion costs of restoring civil, economic 
and human infrastructure. Thus an end to the war would not merely not lead to 
any short term return to the counterfactual non-war output level but might 
also imply a lower growth rate as well during the early stages of 
rehabilitation (though possibly a higher one thereafter). As GDP losses do 
not include damage to capital stock (but only resultant reduction of income 
flows) nor do they exclude security spending, they are likely to be lower than 
systematic estimates on an aggregated basis including these items.
Mozambique by 1980 had reorganised from a traumatic last two years of the 
anti-colonial liberation war and an even more traumatic transition to 
independence. The productive and governmental structures were functioning 
with increasing normality, the underlying growth rate was apparently 4 to 5$. 
As very considerable room for restoration of output existed - as well as for a 
sharp increase in household agricultural production - a 556 1980-86 GDP growth 
path in the absence of destabilisation/war appears not unlikely (comparable to
-12-
Zimbabwe's 4.5? even with significant destabilisation and Malawi's 4? odd 
without comparable margins for growth from output restoration).
On this basis the constant 1980 and current price GDP loss in billions of 
meticais is:
Actual GDP 5? Growth Loss
1980 Current 1980 Current 1980 Currenl
Prices Prices Prices Prices Prices Prices
0OOO'! (Base Year) 78.2 78.2 78.2 78.2 - -
1981 78.9 81.5 82.11 84.22 3.21 3.32
1982 96.1 92.3 86.21 104.56 10.11 12.26
1983 84.2 91.2 90.52 136.77 26.32 45.57
1984 63-9 108.8 95.05 161.85 31.15 53-05
1985 59.6 147.0 99.98 246.13 40.20 99.13
1986* 55.6 194.6 104.79 366.77 49.19 172.17
Total 479.5 793.6 539.5 1,179.50 160 385
* Preliminary estimates assuming continued 6.5 to 7 .0? GDP fall and 42?
price increase.
Converted at official exchange rates (1980 for the constant price series and 
current rates for the year for the current price series) these losses total 
$4,950 million ($4.95 billon) in 198O prices and $9,266 million in current 
prices over 1980-86. The conversion from meticais to dollars poses some 
problems even though the very great magnitude of the loss absolutely and 
relative to GDP is evident. The meticais has become increasingly overvalued 
since 1980. On a rough estimate of converting at an average value of 60% of 
the official rate, the loss comes to roughly $5,500 million over 19 81-86. 
This appears consistent with the World Bank's 1984 GNP estimate of slightly 
over $2,000 million which with subsequent output decline would correspond to 
$1,750-1,850 in 1984 prices in 1986. It is also consistent with Mozambique's 
October 1986 estimate of output loss resulting from the war of $5,500 million.
The pattern of estimated losses corresponds very closely to the rise in the 
level of RSA and MNR proxy force destabilisation, sabotage and mass terrorism. 
This rose from low levels in 1980 and the first half of 1981 to sustained high
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levels from 1983 through 1985. Over 1984-86 the focus of aggression and 
terrorism has shifted away from southern to northern Mozambique and from 
September 1986 the intensity of the war rose to record levels so that the 1986 
loss figures may well be underestimates.
Were the loss calculations run against a 3 % non-war growth rate assumption, 
the 1980-81 losses would be of the order of $4,250 million. While lower this 
is still very high and still implies that by 1986 war was costing Mozambique 
almost half of its normal non-war situation GDP.
A cross check on foreign exchange earnings shows losses of the order of $2,000 
million: $500 million remittances, $800 million rail and harbour revenues, 
$700 million goods. $500 million would have allowed Mozambique to maintain 
external debt service and $1500 - assuming a 3 . 5 to 4.5 GDP to Imports 
incremental ratio - would have allowed additional domestic production - $5,250 
- $6,750 million to GDP consistent with a manageable external balance. These 
calculations - which do not pose conversion problems because the basic 
estimates are in dollars or other convertible currencies - tend to bear out 
the early $5,500 million GDP loss based on estimated non-war output growth.
For Angola the data are much more fragmentary. Also no period of near peace 
analogous to Mozambique's mid-1981 interlude exists. But, as of 1979-80, 
Angola - while still having an output loss hangover of perhaps $0.50 to $0.75 
billion a year from South Africa's 1985 war to install a proxy government - 
had achieved a transition to orderly government, economic policy co-ordination 
and growth. Further in 1979/80 South Africa - for virtually the only time 
since independence - did not have significant numbers of South African armed 
forces members on its soil. In that period the combination of near peace, 
government policy and the oil boom allowed very rapid growth of GDP. 
Therefore growth at a high rate - but one moderately below Botswana's 10.77% a 
year of 1973-84 - should have been attainable in the absence of re-escalated 
RSA and proxy aggression. Q% may be a reasonable estimate.
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Very rough actual and projected non-war GDP figures in billions of constant 
1981 prices US$ are:
Actual Projected Difference
1980 4.11 4.86 (4.61) - 0.95 (- 0.50)
1981 4.14 5.25 (4.98) - 1.11 (- 0.84)
1982 3.53 5.65 (5.37) - 2.12 (- 1.84)
1983 3.71 6.10 (5.80) - 2.39 (- 2.09)
1984 3.89 6.59 (6.26) - 2.70 (- 2.37)
1985 4.00 7.11 (6.76) - 3.11 (- 2 76)
Total Loss 1980 Prices -12.18 (-10.40)
Total Loss Current Prices -15.60 (-13.50)
* At 8% annual growth
( ) Figures assume carry forward annual output loss from 75-79 at
$0.5 billion, others at $0.75 billion.
A reasonable loss range estimate for 1980-85 in 1985 prices would appear to be 
of the order of $13 to $16 billion - just under three times achieved GDP in 
1985 and the 1985 loss was equivalent to 70 to 75% of the output actually 
achieved. A rough 1986 loss estimate is $3.5 to $4.0 billion (vs $3*5 to $4.0 
billion in 1985) for a 1980-86 total of $17 to $19*6 billion but this is a 
very rough guesstimate given the fragmentary nature of Angolan national 
accounts and the sharp fall in the world petroleum price during 1986.
For the other seven states GDP losses turn largely on extra transport costs 
(reducing fob export values/raising cif import unit costs), diversion of 
government revenue to security (with consequential losses to operating imports 
and to investment), to lower RSA customs payments (an agreed revision held up 
for political reasons). These probably total $5,250 to 6,750 million for the 
1980-86 period. As the 1984 GDP of these states was of the order of $15,000 - 
$17,500 million even for the ’less affected’ the cost of destabilisation and 
war have been significant. As pointed out in respect to Mozambique while no 
precision can be claimed for the estimates their order of magnitude is 
massive. In the case of Mozambique achieved GDP is now down to barely half of 
non-war probable GDP and in the case of Angola it is at most two thirds (and 
at best half outside the hydrocarbon sector). The 1980-86 regional total of 
$27,500 to $32,000 million exceeds 1985 or 1986 actual output.
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That the GDP loss estimates somewhat exceed those by the aggregated costs 
method suggests that the latter are incomplete (which is probable) and/or that 
the GDP losses for Angola - and perhaps the 7 - are overstated (which is 
possible but not much more likely than that they are underestimated).
The Human Cost/Inhuman Face
The dislocation of virtually half of the rural populations of Mozambique and 
Angola shows the magnitude and breadth of direct human effects. Indirect are 
even broader because loss of forex earnings, government revenue and food 
production interact to cut access to food, to emergency programmes, to 
education and to health. As these were areas in which at the turn of the 
decade both of the most severely affected countries were making major 
progress, the difference between 1986 actuals and reasonably anticipated 
non-war prognoses is very wide.
The human misery caused by the dislocation itself and by its indirect impact 
are hard to exaggerate or to set down succinctly. For hundreds of thousands 
of households dislocation has meant fleeing (sometimes with wounds or loss of 
a family member) from homesteads with near total loss of housing, food stocks, 
seeds, tools, cattle, trees and household effects. Because of the war's 
crippling affect on government resources rehabilitation programmes have been 
limited even when - as has by no means always been possible - emergency food 
supplies could be provided. Further, many dislocated persons are now either 
in overcrowded areas (near towns, bridges, the Beira and Tete corridors or 
other defended points) chosen for security not farming reasons. This has 
interacted with limited rehabilitation support to limit their ability to 
rebuild their productive base and their lives.
Misery has also been caused by the systematic destruction of schools, health 
posts and clinics, water supplies, agricultural extension stations, local 
grain stores and shops, transport routes and vehicles and mosques and 
churches. Up to a quarter of rural units of these types in Angola and 
Mozambique have been destroyed as a key component of the Republic of South 
Africa's mass proxy terror campaign. In numerous cases their personnel have 
been kidnapped, mutilated or murdered. The detailed Mozambican statistics by
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province and by year show very clearly how MNR actions have eroded the base of 
civil society and of the infrastructure vital to averting abject misery and 
lack of basic services in rural areas.
Direct military and civilian war deaths have been estimated at 100,000 by 
Mozambique and fragmentary data suggest at least as high a figure for Angola. 
In both countries mass starvation has resulted from war interference with food 
production, with transport and with export earnings to pay for food imports. 
The 1983-84 Mozambican death toll from starvation was 100,000; that in Angola
- spread over a longer period - is at least comparable. In Mozambique 
official estimates indicate that 3»800,000 people cannot be fed from domestic 
production and are in grave danger of extreme malnutrition or starvation in 
the absence of very high levels of food aid. In Angola at least 650,000 
internal refugees totally dependent on state provision are in the same 
position, but as data on many rural areas are totally lacking this is
certainly a partial rather than a total estimate of the number of human lives
at risk.
Perhaps the most chilling estimates are those for infant and child mortality. 
As of 1980 both Angola and - especially - Mozambique had organised health care 
around universal access, preventative and simple curative emphases. Coverage 
was rising rapidly and infant and young child mortality declining. By 1986 it 
would have been reasonable to assume the "under 5" deaths per 1000 live births 
would have reached the Tanzania level (itself by no means low) of 185. In 
fact, with the resurgence of war, the best field estimates place them at 
325-350. On the basis of the lower figure (325), 535,000 infants and young
children in Angola and Mozambique are dead who, in the absence of war, would
have been alive.
The total deaths resulting from war in the region (including much lower 
numbers in other states) over 1980-81 are thus of the order of 1,000,000. 
While some double-counting exists in the component sub-totals, the 
non-starvation nutrition and disease related "excess" deaths of 5 to 14 year 
old children and of adults have not been estimated and must be significant, so 
that the 1,000,000 lives lost is a reasonable order of magnitude 
approximation. For what they are worth, the contrasts between the Angola and 
Mozambique life expectancies at birth - mid-40s - and population growth rates
- 2.6% a year - with those of the 7 'less affected' - mid-50s and over 3%
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respectively - bear out this sombre estimate. Even without further escalation 
or a 'full scale' famine in either Mozambique or Angola the war related death 
toll for 1987 is likely to be of the order of 200,000 human lives.
The infant and young child deaths are particularly appalling. In 1986 they 
probably total 140,000 in Angola and Mozambique - 1 every 4 minutes.
President Machel's hope for the future is being falsified brutally. Far from 
being the "flowers that do not wither", the children of Mozambique and Angola 
are being cut off by the scores of thousands by the war.
Escalation? Generalisation?
At first glance it might seem little more could be done to harm Mozambique and 
Angola. That unfortunately is not the case. MNR activity (with now overt RSA 
and passive Malawi support) has risen radically since September; The Republic 
of South Africa has promised to repatriate up to 300,000 contract and 'illegal 
workers' and refugees. In Angola to date petroleum production facilities have 
not been significantly damaged, although - vide the 1985 Cabinda attempt (the 
best known of several) they are targets.
More generally RSA has threatened to interfere with transit traffic and to 
repatriate workers as well as acting in ways at least consistent with 
preparing to step up the terrorism front of the war in Zimbabwe and to 
relaunch it in Zambia. This would mark a shift as in the past RSA has sought 
to lock Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Malawi into its transport and trade 
system but not to lay waste their economies (and thus its own markets).
Similarly the disastrous results of Malawi's - at the least - tacit acceptance 
of the role of MNR base, safety zone and resupply route has now virtually 
destroyed ground routes out of that land locked (and Front Line State locked) 
country. Excess transport costs for 1985 were already estimated 
semi-officially at $ 140 million a year and for 1986 rough indications suggest 
a rise to $ 160 million or about half the value of merchandise exports. These 
costs have crippled viability of several key exports notably sugar, groundnuts 
and maize. They have also worsened Malawi's already precarious external and 
fiscal balance positions. GDP growth has since the early 1980s declined to 
significantly under the 3*1# annual population growth.
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A renewed offensive to block the Beira Corridor has been launched and one 
against the Dar Corridor is at least potentially feasible. If these are 
severed - indeed if their rehabilitation is blocked - the landlocked core of 
SADCC and the FLS will either have to become clients of RSA or face appalling 
economic costs. Prime Minister Mugabe was not guilty of hyperbole when he 
said of Mozambique: "Their struggle is our struggle; their fall will assuredly 
be our fall".
Are There Practicable Courses of Counter Action?
Any strategy for reducing war costs - given the assumption of at least interim
continuation in power of the present rulers of RSA - would require three
parts:
1. Survival and Rehabilitation Assistance concentrated on health, nutrition, 
water and education linked to rehabilitation of dislaced persons, workers 
extruded from RSA and external refugees;
2. Destabilisation potential reduction and structural shift investment 
centred on transport, power, commercial infrastructure and selected basic 
goods production in industry and agriculture;
3. Improvement of security both generally and in particular for key economic
and social enterprises and units.
Rough estimates for the first two categories have been made and appear to
total $6,000-7,000 million over 3 years. (These were made in the specific 
context of sanctions against apartheid but relaxation of that assumption 
affects programme cost or content only marginally.) By the fourth year 
additional GDP would cover the recurrent costs of the programme and the
’excess’ (above normal levels) investment costs should not exceed $500 million
(assuming the first three years’ targets had been met) .
The first set of programmes would in practice closely resemble a UNICEF/IL0 
health and nutrition plus productive employment/self employment package. The 
second is very close to a selective speeding up of the pre-existing SADCC
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Programme of Action. The basic problem of attaining implementation of these
programmes is cost - most of the added funds would need to be secured 
internationally.
However, in practice economic strategy, policy and programming - indeed the 
economy more generally - in Southern Africa must be considered as the economic 
front of war and its two way interactions with the military front analysed and 
acted upon. This has not been done to date. The degree to which economic and 
security planning and implementation remain in nearly totally separate boxes 
even now and even in Mozambique is remarkable. The degree to which external 
agencies cooperating with Southern African states are able to avoid explicit
recognition of their being in a war zone in no less remarkable.
To analyse these interactions in any detail is beyond the scope or purpose of 
the present essay. What is relevant is that achievement of the economic 
programme will require:
1. expanded security capacity;
2. more coordination in location of economic projects with a view to their 
security and in provision of security for key economic and social units 
and sectors.
Conclusion - A Lutta Continua
The foregoing survey of data - despite the fragmentary and somewhat
speculative nature of much of it leads to several conclusions.
First, in terms of macro economic and of human costs the war of
destabilisation and aggression waged by South Africa against its neighbours is 
a major - not a minor, "quiet", nor "bush" - one. How major it is has been 
grossly underestimated in the past, even in the region.
Second, the war is the central fact of economic life (and death) in Mozambique 
and to a slightly lesser extent in Angola. If South Africa applies its total 
strategy more rigorously to the central landlocked quadrant of SADCC 
(Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi), it will become a dominant factor for
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these countries/economies as well. This will be especially true if the Beira 
and Dar es Salaam transport corridors are seriously sabotaged and/or 
inadequately rehabilitated.
Third, the massive ’employment'/production and human misery problem posed by 
the present 8.5 million odd dislocated persons (largely the victims of mass 
terrorism) will be exacerbated by repatriation of workers over 1987 albeit how 
many is not yet forecastable. In the repatriation cases severe rural 
household income losses will interact with macro foreign exchange availability 
reduction to the economies of Mozambique and Lesotho.
Fourth, the war has already severely increased the foreign exchange 
constraints on Angola and Mozambique as well as Malawi and to a lesser extent 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho and Botswana. In parallel - with respect to 
displacements' effect on production and the foreign exchange loss impact on 
ability to import - it has sharply worsened the micro (or household) and 
national food security positions of Mozambique and Angola.
Fifth, programmatic action to sustain life, reduce 'excess' death rates, 
rehabilitate key economic sectors, help displaced persons (including returning 
workers and their households), rehabilitate their income earning capacity and 
recreate lower cost, non-dependent transport routes is possible. It would - 
if not destroyed by the war - have high to medium benefit/cost ratios 
economically and high ones in human survival and welfare terms. However, the 
cost of such programmes is beyond what SADCC States alone can fund.
Sixth, any programme with a pretence to realism must - in one way or another - 
face the security question.
Annex
Quality of Life in Southern African States: Selected Health, Nutrition,










TABLE 1: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR ANGOLA 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1 . Under Five Mortality Rate - 260 325-375a
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1)
for 1000 live births) 175 155 200
3. Infant deaths (under 1) '1000 - 56 59
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 37 41 43
5. 0ne-Year-01ds (%) TB - - 40
fully immunized DPT - - 8
against: Polio - - 55
Measles - - 62
6. Number of ORS Packets per 100
infants and children - 52 16
7. Access to Health
Services ($ of pop.) : Total - 30 -
Urban/Rural - - -
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 21 21
(% of population): Urban/Rural — 85/10 85/10
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - 30 -
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - - -
(Í) : Severe - - -
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 83 87
11 . Food production per capita Index (1 974-
1976 = 100) - 90 82
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982)
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female
13. Children completing primary level (% of 
first grade)
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total













15. Total population (million) - 7.7 8.5
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 1 .4 1.5
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 3.6 4.0
18. Urban population {% of total) - 21 24
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - 2.6 -
(1973"1983) % : Urban — 6.0 —
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income - 490 -
21. Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - - -
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - - 6.1
23- Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence 5.8/-/- 6.6/-/- 6.4/-/-
24. 0DA (1983)s (in US$ millions) 75 75
: As % of GNP 2 2
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) _ 16
a. Estimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war.
b. Economist Intelligence Unit.
TABLE 2: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR BOTSWANA 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1 . Under Five Mortality Rate - 110 100
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1)
for 1000 live births) 100 80 75
3. Infant deaths (under 1) '1000 - 3.6 3.8
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 50 54 55
5. One-Year-Olds (%) TB 91 83 70
fully immunized DPT 70 71 82
against: Polio 45 69 77
Measles 68 76 75
6. Number of ORS Packets per 100
infants and children - 15(1981 ) 194
7. Access to Health
Services (% of pop.) : Total - 89 -
Urban/Rural - 100/85 -
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 76 -
(% of population): Urban/Rural — 98/72 —
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - - 32
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - 27 31
(%) : Severe - - 1
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 94 -
11 . Food production per capita Index (1974—
1976 = 100) — 62
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 76
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 71/81
13. Children completing primary level (% of
first grade) 73 -
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total 42 61 -
(15 + years) {%) Male/Female 41/43 61/61 -
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 0.915 1.1
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 185 213
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 0.473 0.542
18. Urban population ($ of total) - 15 18
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - - -
(1973-1983) % : Urban - - -
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income — _ 920
21. Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % 40/45 - —
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - 8.5 6.6
23• Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence - _ _
24. 0DA (1983): (in US$ millions) 184 -
: As % of GNP 11 -
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) - _ -
TABLE 3: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR LESOTHO 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1. Under Five Mortality Rate - 160 145
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1)
for 1000 live births) 135 115 110
3. Infant deaths (under 1) '1000 - 6.6 6.7
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 44 48 50
5. One-Year-Olds (í) TB - 81 91
fully immunized DPT - 56 59
against: Polio - 54 64
Measles - 49 63
6. Number of ORS Packets per 100
infants and children - 11 -
7. Access to Health
Services (Í of pop.) : Total - - -
Urban/Rural - - -
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 14 -
(Í of population): Urban/Rural 37/11
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - - -
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - - -
{%) : Severe - - -
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 107 100
11. Food production per capita Index (1974-
1976 = 100) “ 82 76
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 71
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 60/82
13. Children completing primary level (% of
first grade) 83 -
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total 62 70 -
(15 + years) (%) Male/Female 49/74 58/81 —
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 1.3 1.5
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 224 250
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 590 657
18. Urban population (% of total) - 5 6
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - 2.5 -
(1973-1983) % : Urban — 21.4
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income - - 460
21. Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - 50/55 -
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - 6.3 1.2
23. Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence 8/20/- - -
24. ODA (1983): (in US$ millions) - - 102
: as % of GNP - -15
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) - - -3
TABLE 4: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR MALAWI 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators 
1. Under Five Mortality Rate _ 300 280
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1) 
for 1000 live births) 195 170 160
3. Infant deaths (under 1) '1000 - 54 57
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 40 44 52
5. One-Year-Olds (%) TB - 86 72
fully immunized DPT - 66 66
against: Polio - 68 68
Measles - 65 14
6. Number of 0RS Packets per 100 
infants and children 22 12
7. Access to Health
Services (% of pop,) : Total . 80
Urban/Rural - - -
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 41 -
(% of population): Urban/Rural - 77/37 -
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - - 31
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - - 30
(%) : Severe - - 1
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 94 97
11. Food production per capita Index (1974—
1976 = 100) — 99 101
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 46
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 50/42
13. Children completing primary level (% of
first grade) - 28
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total 29 36 -
(15 + years) (%) Male/Female 42/18 48/25 -
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 5.9 6.9
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 1 .2 1.4
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 3.0 3.4
18. Urban population (% of total) - 12 12
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - 3.0 -
(1973-1983) % : Urban — 7.3 -
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income - — 210
21. Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - 25/85 -
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - 2.2 0.5
23* Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence - _ 5/14/8
24. ODA (1983)5 (in US$ millions) - — 117
: As % of GNP — 8
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) - — 20
TABLE 5; SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR MOZAMBIQUE 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1 . Under Five Mortality Rate - 270 325-375
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1) o
for 1000 live births) 170 160 200
3. Infant deaths (under 1) 11000 - 85 90
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 43 45 -
5. 0ne~Year-01ds (%) TB - 46 -
fully immunized DPT - 56 -
against: Polio - 32 -
Measles - 32 -
6. Number of 0RS Packets per 100
infants and children - - 102
7. Access to Health
Services {% of pop.) : Total - 30 -
Urban/Rural - - -
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 13 -
(Í of population): Urban/Rural — 50/7 “
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - 29 -
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - - -
(%) : Severe - - -
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 70 79
11 . Food production per capita Index (1974-
1976 = 100) — 84 68
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 46
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 51/41
13. Children completing primary level ($ of
first grade) 26 -
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total 21 33 27(1982)
(15 + years) (%) Male/Female 25/14 44/23 44/12
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 12 14
1 6. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 2.2 2.5
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 5.6 6.4
18. Urban population (% of total) - 13 18
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - 2.6 -
(1973-1983) % : Urban - 10.2 -
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income - 230 -
21. Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - - -
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - - 5.1
23. Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence - - -
24. 0DA (1983)5 (in US$ millions) - _ 211
: As % of GNP - - 8
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) — - —
a. Estimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war.
TABLE 6: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR SWAZILAND 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1 . Under Five Mortality Rate - 200 185
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1)
for 1000 live births) 145 135 125
3. Infant deaths (under 1) ’1000 - 3.6 3.8
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 44 48 56
5. One-Year-Olds (%) TB - 59 95
fully immunized DPT - 30 79
against: Polio - 22 60
Measles - 30 51
6. Number of ORS Packets per 100
infants and children - 87 409
7. Access to Health
Services (% of pop.) : Total - - -
Urban/Rural - - -
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 39 48
(% of population): Urban/Rural — 73/35 80/40
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - 10 -
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - - -
(%) : Severe - - -
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 108 -
11 . Food production per capita Index (1974-
1976 = 100) - 108 107
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 84
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 83/86
13. Children completing primary level (% of
first grade) 8 -
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total 48 61 -
(15 + years) (%) Male/Female 51/45 64/58 -
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 559 632
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 104 119
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 265 302
18. Urban population {% of total) - 20 25
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - - -
(1973-1983) % : Urban - - -
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income _ _ 870
21. Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - 45 50
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - - 5.1/-
23. Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence — _ -
24. ODA (1983)i (in US$ millions) _ 34
: As % of GNP _ 6
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) - _ -
TABLE 7: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR TANZANIA 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1. Under Five Mortality Rate - 200 185
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1)
for 1000 live births) 130 120 110
3. Infant deaths (under 1) '1000 - 116 122
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 45 50 52
5. One-Year-Olds (56) TB - 84 -
fully immunized DPT - 58 -
against: Polio - 56 -
Measles - 82 -
6. Number of ORS Packets per 100
infants and children - - -
7. Access to Health
Services (% of pop.) : Total - 70 -
Urban/Rural - 100/66 -
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 47 -
(Í of population): Urban/Rural — 88/41 —
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - 50 -
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - 43 -
(%) : Severe - 7 -
10. Daily per capita calorie intake of
requirements) - 83a 101
11. Food production per capita Index (1974—
1976 = 100) — 96 103
Education Indicators K
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 98
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 101/95
13. Children completing primary level {% of
first grade) 76 K
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total - - 85
(15 + years) (Í) Male/Female — — 90/80
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 19 22
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 3.8 4.4
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 9.6 11
18. Urban population (% of total) - 12 14
19* Population Annual Growth Rate Total - 3-3 -
(1973-1983) % : Urban — 8.6 —
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income - - 240
21. Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - - 15/25
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - 0.9- 6.5
23. Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence - - 4/8/10
24. ODA (1983)5 (in US$ millions) - - 621
: As % of GNP - 13
25• Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) 5 - -
a. Not comparable. 1980 estimate based on old series and 1984 on major
nutrition survey based on 19 76/86. 
b, From 1985 UNICEF Country Situation Report.
table) 8: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR ZAMBIA 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1 . Under Five Mortality Rate - 150 135
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1)
for 1000 live births) 110 100 85
3. Infant deaths (under 1) ’ 1000 - 25 27
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 46 50 52a
5. 0ne-Year-01ds (%) TB - 72 87
fully immunized DPT - 44 49
against: Polio - 77 47
Measles - 21 56
6. Number of ORS Packets per 100
infants and children — 4 -
7. Access to Health
Services (% of pop.) : Total - - 75
Urban/Rural - - -/-
8. Access to Safe Water Total - - 46
(% of population): Urban/Rural — — -/-
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - - 28
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - - -
(Í) : Severe - - -
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 93 89
11 . Food production per capita Index (1974—
1976 = 100) — 76 74
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 94
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 100/89
13. Children completing primary level {% of
first grade) 85 -
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total - 51 68
(15 + years) (%) Male/Female — 66/37 79/58
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 5.6 6.5
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 1.1 1.2
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 2.8 3.2
18. Urban population (% of total) - 43 48
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - 3.2 -
(1973-1983) % : Urban - 6.5 -
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income _ _ 470b
21, Population in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - - 25
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - 1.3- -1.8
23. Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence - _ 8/15/-
24. 0DA (1983): (in US$ millions) - - 216
: As % of GNP — 6
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 19 83) 6 13 -
a. Based on 1983 World Bank estimate of 52.
b, 1984 World Bank Figure.
TABLE59: SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR ZIMBABWE 1970-1984
KEY INDICATORS 1970 1980 1984
Health Indicators
1. Under Five Mortality Rate - 130 120
2. Infant Mortality Rate (under 1)
for 1000 live births) 95 85 75
3. Infant deaths (under 1) ’1000 - 29 31
4. Life Expectancy at Birth (years): Total 50 55 63
5. One-Year-Olds (%) TB - 64 88
fully immunized DPT - 39 68
against: Polio - 38 63
Measles - 56 55
6. Number of ORS Packets per 100
infants and children - - -
7. Access to Health
Services (% of pop.) : Total - - 71
Urban/Rural - - 100/62
8. Access to Safe Water Total - 52 -
(Í of population): Urban/Rural — -/-
Nutrition Indicators
9. Infant and child Total - - -
malnutrition Mild/Moderate - - -
(%)  : Severe - - -
10. Daily per capita calorie intake (% of
requirements) - 86 89
11. Food production per capita Index (197^—
1976 = 100) — 74 79
Education Indicators
12. Primary enrolment ratio: Total (1982) - - 131
G = Gross, N = Net: Male/Female - 135/126
13. Children completing primary level (% of
first grade) - 77
14. Adult Literacy Rate: Total 55 69 -
(15 + years) (%) Male/Female 63/47 77/61
Demographic Indicators
15. Total population (million) - 7.4 8.5
16. Population Aged 0-4 years (million) - 1.4 1.6
17. Population Aged 0-15 years (million) - 3.6 4.2
18. Urban population (% of total) - 22 24
19. Population Annual Growth Rate Total - 3.2 -
(1973-1983) % : Urban — 6.0 “
Economic Indicators
20. GNP per capita (1980) in $
GNP Group: lower-middle-income - - 740
21 . Population .in Absolute Poverty
(urban/rural) % - - -
22. GNP per capita annual growth rate
(1965-83) (2980-83) % - 1.5 -2.9
23. Government Expenditure on health/
eduation/defence - - 6/22/17
24. ODA (1983)5 rin US$ millions) - - 208
: As % of GNP - 4
25. Debt service (as % of Exports of Goods
and Services 1970+ 1983) - - 32
Glossary
Republic of South Africa 
(RSA, South African)
Southern Africa

















"Infant and Young Child 
Mortality"
(Under 5 Mortality)
The apartheid state and its instrumentalities.
The nine independent states of the Southern 
African Region (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia).
Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia’s regional political and 
security strategy and policy coordination 
grouping.
Southern African political economic strategy, 
policy and programming coordination grouping 
aimed at reducing economic dependence 
(especially on RSA) and national economic 
development in a regional context comprising 
FLS plus Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland.
Proxy force created by Rhodesian Intelligence 
and turned over to RSA as an instrument to wage 
aggressive war on Mozambique. (Officially 
referred to by Mozambique as "armed bandits".)
Former Angolan regional political and military 
grouping frequently in alliance with Portugal 
during Angolan liberation struggle; since 1975 
increasingly a ’pure’ South African proxy 
force. (Usually officially referred to by 
Angola as "rebels".)
South African trained and directed splinter of 
former Basotho political party.
South African trained and directed band of 
deserters from ZAPU plus ex-Muzorewa 'Home 
Guards'. Does not include most of armed ZAPU 
"dissidents". (Usually officially referred to 
by Zimbabwe as "terrorists".)
Defunct bandit group operating in Zambia in 
1970s, recruited and trained by RSA.
African National Congress, principal South 
African liberation movement.
A country's total output of goods and services.
The number of infants per 1,000 live births who 
die before the age of 1 year.
The number of infants and children per 1000 
live births who die before 5 years of age.
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